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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
LABOR LAW: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ANTI-
CLOSED SHOP AMENDMENT
Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
69 Sup. Ct. 251 (1949)
Plaintiff labor union brought suit for a declaratory judgment testing
the constitutionality of a Nebraska constitutional amendment prohibiting
the closed shop. 1 The plaintiff contended that this law violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution in that it was designed to deprive all persons of "liberty" (1)
to refuse to hire or retain any person in employment because he was or
was not a union member, and (2) to make a contract or agreement to
engage in such discrimination against union or non-union workers. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the constitutionality of the amend-
ment, and the plaintiff appealed. HELD, the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution2 does not forbid a state to pass laws clearly designed
to safeguard the opportunities of all persons, union and non-union, in
obtaining employment free from discrimination because they are union or
non-union workers. Judgment affirmed.
From early times a shop closed to workers who refused to join the
union has been one of the first objectives of organized labor; 3 yet its
achievement has been slow and tortuous in an industrial society, as has
been that of all rights of labor unions. Even when the rights of labor
began to gain recognition, the dominant forces of a laissez-faire economy
and the prevailing attitude of individualism resulted in a largely unre-
stricted right of formulating contracts as between employer and employee;
this was considered a matter of individual liberty and property preserved
inviolate by the Federal Constitution.4
In 1907 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional Con-
'NEB. CoNsT. Art XV, §13:
"No person shall be denied employment because of membership in or affiliation
with or resignation or explusion from a labor organization or because of refusal
to join or affiliate with a labor organization; nor shall any individual or corpor-
ation or association of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude
persons from employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor
organization."
"U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, §1.
ToNER, TB C.osED SHOP 22 (1942).
'DAuOEERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS iN AmECAN INxsTRY 429 (3d. ed. 1936); Abelow,
The Closed Shop in New York, 7 BROOxLyx L. REv. 464 (1938).
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gressional legislation making it a criminal offense to discharge an employee
because of his membership in a labor organization. 5 This, in effect,
legitimatized one of the employer's most vicious weapons -the "yellow
dog" contract. A few years later the Court, following its earlier man-
date, invalidated a Kansas statute outlawing the "yellow dog" contract
as a denial of the liberty of the parties, guaranteed by the due process
clause, to fix their own terms of employment.6
During the next few years labor received some encouragement from
decisions upholding state regulation of working hours as a reasonable
exercise of the police power for the health of its citizens, 7 but this trend
was temporarily checked by the Adkins decision s in 1923 that state leg-
islation providing for minimum wages for women and children was invalid,
even though the cases were argued on the same basis.
The decision that manifested the change in the viewpoint did not
involve a labor issue.. The United States Supreme Court held in 1933
that a state could by appropriate measures set a minimum price in busi-
nesses affected with a public interest even though not utilities, and that
it might adopt any economic policy reasonably deemed to promote the
public welfare and might enforce it by legislation adapted to the purpose
selected without violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 Decisions following soon afterward conclusively established
this liberal due process theory,' 0 adding the obvious factor that the
various legislatures must have the power to make use of this "trial and
error" method of social reform without the former amount of judicial
interference." This is typified by the 1935 decision in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,'2 which specifically overruled the Adkins case and held
that a minimum-wage law for women was valid. Speaking broadly, it
rested on the power to restrict freedom of contract between employers
and employees in the public interest. All contracts, therefore, are subject
to the paramount authority of the state by means of its police power to
safeguard not only the health, morals and safety of its citizens but like-
wise their economic needs, provided the economic scope of the business
involved is quantitatively broad enough to be capable of disturbing the
5Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
'Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915).
'Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
0Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
"0See note 7 supra.
"1See note 8 suPra.
1300 U. S. 379 (1937).
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